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Implicit mentalizing, a fast, unconscious and rigid way of processing other’s mental
states has recently received much interest in typical social cognitive development in
early childhood and in adults with autism spectrum condition (ASC). This research
suggests that already infants implicitly mentalize, and that adults with ASC have a
sustained implicit mentalizing deficit. Yet, we have only sparse empirical evidence
on implicit mentalizing beyond early childhood, and deviations thereof in children
with ASC. Here, we administered an implicit mentalizing eye tracking task to assess
the sensitivity to false beliefs to a group of 8-year-old children with and without
ASC, matched for chronological age, verbal and non-verbal IQ. As previous research
suggested that presenting outcomes of belief-based actions leads to fast learning
from experience and false belief-congruent looking behavior in adults with ASC, we
were also interested in whether already children with ASC learn from such information.
Our results provide support for a persistent implicit mentalizing ability in neurotypical
development beyond early childhood. Further, they confirmed an implicit mentalizing
deficit in children with ASC, even when they are closely matched to controls for
explicit mentalizing skills. In contrast to previous findings with adults, no experience-
based modulation of anticipatory looking was observed. It seems that children with
ASC have not yet developed compensatory general purpose learning mechanisms.
The observed intact explicit, but impaired implicit mentalizing in ASC, and correlation
patterns between mentalizing tasks and executive function tasks, are in line with theories
on two dissociable mentalizing systems.
Keywords: mentalizing, implicit Theory of Mind, autism spectrum condition, executive function, eye tracking
INTRODUCTION
Implicit mentalizing, or implicit Theory of Mind (ToM), a fast, unconscious and rigid way of
processing others’ mental states, such as beliefs or desires, has recently received much interest
in research on typical and atypical social cognitive development (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009;
Baillargeon et al., 2010; Sodian, 2011; Senju, 2012). One key finding is that already children
younger than 4 years of age implicitly mentalize. For example, results from violation of expectation
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paradigms suggest that already in their second year of life,
children process an agent’s true and false belief. In these tasks,
they look longer at events in which an agent acts incongruently
to her mental state, e.g., when she does not look for an object
where she believes it is located, but at a different location (Onishi
and Baillargeon, 2005; Surian et al., 2007; Song et al., 2008).
According to recent theories, implicit mentalizing continues to
exist alongside the ability to explicitly mentalize, that is, to
deliberately consider another’s mental state, in children above the
age of 4 years, as well as in adults (cf., Apperly and Butterfill, 2009;
Perner and Roessler, 2012).
Anticipatory looking paradigms revealed that children
younger than 4 years of age not only expect an agent to act
according to her beliefs, but that they also use her mental state
to predict upcoming actions (Clements and Perner, 1994; Surian
and Geraci, 2012; Thoermer et al., 2012; Low and Watts, 2013).
In an influential study, Southgate et al. (2007) familiarized
25-month-olds with an agent and her goal to retrieve an object
in one of two boxes. In the test trial, the agent was distracted and
did not witness that the object was removed from the box she
had lastly seen it in. When the agent turned back to the scene,
the children’s anticipatory gaze indicated that they predicted the
agent would open the door next to the now empty box. This
suggests that they were sensitive to the agent’s false belief.
Another key finding is that individuals with autism spectrum
condition (ASC) have an implicit mentalizing deficit (Senju et al.,
2009; Schneider et al., 2013; Sodian et al., 2015). This deficit is
thought to contribute to social interaction deficits in ASC (Frith,
2012; Senju, 2012). Employing equivalent anticipatory paradigms
as described above, Senju et al. (2009) found that adults with ASC
lacked the spontaneous appreciation of the agent’s false belief and
did not reliably produce according action predictions.
Interestingly, this and other studies found a dissociation
between implicit and explicit mentalizing (Senju et al., 2009;
Schneider et al., 2013; cf., Abell et al., 2000): While implicit
mentalizing seemed to be persistently impaired, participants with
ASC were able to solve explicit mentalizing tasks. This led to the
conclusion that individuals with ASC, especially those with high-
functioning autism and Asperger syndrome, cope with explicit
mentalizing deficits (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) by developing
compensatory strategies (Bowler, 1992; Happé, 1995; Ozonoff
and Miller, 1995).
However, a recent study by Schuwerk et al. (2015) found
that an implicit mentalizing deficit might be addressable by
compensatory learning. In contrast to previous anticipatory
looking false belief tasks, Schuwerk et al. (2015) presented
the false belief-based action and its outcome, i.e., looking for
the object in the empty box. Based on this perception-action
contingency it is possible to form the non-mentalistic rule “if
the agent did not witness the object transfer, she will look into
the box that is empty by now.” Interestingly, after adults with
ASC had the critical outcome information at the end of the
first test trial, their performance on the second test trial in this
implicit mentalizing task was comparable to that of neurotypical
controls. This suggests that individuals with ASC might be able
to modify their performance in an implicit mentalizing task by
experience.
To date, we lack clear understanding of implicit mentalizing
in typical and atypical social cognitive development in two
aspects. First, we know little about an implicit mentalizing
deficit in children with ASC. In the one study that documented
this deficit in 8-year-old children with ASC, the children with
and without ASC differed also to some extent in their explicit
mentalizing competence (Senju et al., 2010). Thus, for drawing
more firm conclusions about the implicit – explicit dissociation
and impaired implicit mentalizing in ASC, one has to look at
implicit mentalizing in children with and without ASC who pass
explicit mentalizing tasks.
Moreover, a recent study employing a presumably more
engaging mentalizing paradigm showed that 10-year-old children
with ASC were able to spontaneously track another’s belief
(Peterson et al., 2013). In a competitive game, one of two agents
ended up with a false belief about the location of a prize. The
other agent and the child knew where the prize was hidden. The
child was encouraged to get the price, but only after he or she had
nominated one of the agents to look for it first. Thus, to gain the
price, the child should choose the agent with the false belief, who
would not find it so that they could get it themselves. The majority
of 10-year-olds with ASC opted for the agent with the false belief.
At the same time, they performed poorly on a standard explicit
false belief paradigm.
Although it is unclear to what extent the task by Peterson et al.
(2013) tapped into the same implicit/spontaneous mentalizing
ability as the anticipatory looking paradigm employed by Senju
et al. (2010), their findings suggest that the conclusion that
children with ASC have an implicit mentalizing deficit may be
premature.
Second, we have only sparse empirical evidence on implicit
mentalizing beyond early childhood, as most previous research
studied infant or adult samples (for an example of the latter,
see van der Wel et al., 2014). One recent example of a
study investigating implicit and explicit mentalizing in older
children comes from Grosse Wiesmann et al. (2016). These
authors found the usual developmental trend in explicit false
belief understanding between 3 and 4 years of age. However,
implicit false belief understanding was already present and
stable in this age range (see also Low, 2010). More evidence
is necessary to conclude that implicit mentalizing continuously
persists in parallel to a corresponding explicit system beyond
early childhood, when children become increasingly proficient
in advanced and second order mentalizing (e.g., Perner and
Wimmer, 1985; Osterhaus et al., 2016).
To address these issues, we administered an implicit
mentalizing task to a group of 8-year-old children with and
without ASC, who were matched for chronological age, verbal
and non-verbal intelligence, executive function skills1 and
explicit mentalizing ability. We employed an anticipatory looking
eye tracking paradigm that was previously used with adults
(Schuwerk et al., 2015) and that was adapted from previous
paradigms (Southgate et al., 2007; Senju et al., 2010). In this
1The two groups were meant to be matched for executive function. However,
although both children with ASC and controls performed comparably well, they
differed significantly in their executive function skill. We provide details on this
result, post hoc analyses and a discussion of this finding.
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task, an agent looks for an object in one of two boxes. In
two familiarization trials, she observes the self-propelled object
entering one box, opens the box, and finds the object. In two test
trials, the agent is distracted, and consequently ends up with a
false belief about the object’s location and reaches for the object
in the empty box.
We reasoned that if implicit mentalizing is a phenomenon
dissociated from explicit mentalizing and specifically impaired
in ASC, we should observe a group difference in the implicit
mentalizing task in the current sample of children with ASC who
are competent in explicit mentalizing tasks.
Further, as the previous study by Schuwerk et al. (2015)
suggested that presenting the outcome of a false belief-based
action leads to fast learning from experience and false belief-
congruent looking behavior in adults with ASC, we were
interested in whether already children with ASC learn from such
information. If this were the case, we should find an effect of
test trial repetition on false-belief congruent action anticipation
in children with ASC.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 14 children with ASC (Mage = 8.0 years, SD= 1.8 years;
one female) participated in the study. Another 10 children
with ASC were tested, but had to be excluded due to missing
gaze data in one or both test trials of the implicit mentalizing
task (n = 6) or not fulfilling inclusion criteria in the implicit
mentalizing task (n = 4, see the data analysis section for
details). All participants with ASC were clinically assessed by
a psychologist or a psychiatrist and were required to fulfill the
International Classification of Diseases-10th Revision (ICD)-
10 criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) for either
Asperger Syndrome (n = 8), high-functioning autism (n = 5) or
atypical autism (n = 1). We used two ASC screening tests which
were filled by the caregivers to corroborate group assignment: the
Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS), introduced by Constantino
and Gruber, 2005 (German version by Bölte et al., 2008; cut-
off criterion: T-score ≥ 60), and the Social Communication
Questionnaire (SCQ, current form; discriminative cut-off: sum
score≥ 15) introduced by Rutter et al. (2003; German version by
Bölte and Poustka, 2006). The SRS was used as a more general
assessment of autistic traits whereas the SCQ questionnaire was
applied as a measure of current communication skills and social
functioning. In the SRS, the ASC group had a mean T-score of
80.8 (range = 70–100, SD = 9.1). The mean SCQ sum score was
16.6 (range = 9–27, SD = 6.0). Note that seven participants with
ASC scored below the cut-off value of 15, indicating a currently
alleviated communication skills and social functioning deficit in
this subgroup.
The control group consisted of 21 neurotypical children
(Mage = 7.2 years, SD = 1.4; six females). Five additional
participants had to be excluded due to missing gaze data
in one or both test trials of the implicit mentalizing task
(n = 1) or not fulfilling inclusion criteria in the implicit
mentalizing task (n = 4). The control group was matched for
chronological age, t(31) = 1.45, p = 0.156, Cohen’s d = 0.52,
non-verbal IQ, t(31) = −0.02, p = 0.988, Cohen’s d = −0.01,
verbal IQ, t(31) = 1.26, p = 0.219, Cohen’s d = 0.45, and
explicit ToM ability, t(31) = −1.64, p = 0.112, Cohen’s
d = −0.59, based on the ToM scales by Wellman and Liu
(2004, for details see the tasks and material section). The
verbal and non-verbal IQ were obtained using subtests of
the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence-
III (WPPSI-III; Wechsler, 2002; German Version: Hannover-
Wechsler-Intelligenztest für das Vorschulalter – III, HAWIVA-
III; Ricken et al., 2007) and the Wechsler Intelligence Score
for Children-IV (WISC-IV; Wechsler, 2004; German Version:
Hamburg-Wechsler-Intelligenztest für Kinder – IV, HAWIK-IV;
Petermann and Petermann, 2007). For the verbal IQ the subtest
used from the WPPSI-III was Vocabulary (passive and active)
and from the WISC-IV Vocabulary and Picture Concepts. For
the non-verbal IQ the subtest Block Design and Matrix Reasoning
were used from both IQ test. The control group had significantly
less autistic traits as assessed by the SRS and SCQ. The average
SRS T-score was 38.9 (range = 25–55, SD = 8.5), the average
SCQ sum score was 2.7 (range = 0–7, SD = 1.7). There was
a significant difference between the ASC group and the control
group in both the SRS, t(33)= 13.91, p< 0.001, Cohen’s d= 4.84,
and the SCQ, t(33)= 10.11, p< 0.001, Cohen’s d = 3.52.
The caregivers gave informed written consent. Children
received a present for their participation. Their caregivers
received monetary compensation for travel expenses. The ethics
committee of the Department of Psychology and Education of
LMU Munich approved the study.
Tasks and Material
Implicit Mentalizing Task
This implicit mentalizing task was adapted from previous eye
tracking false belief paradigms (Southgate et al., 2007; Senju
et al., 2010; Thoermer et al., 2012). The same task was previously
used with a sample of adults with and without ASC (Schuwerk
et al., 2015). Figure 1 provides an overview of trials and scene
setup. In two familiarization trials (each lasting for 32 s), an
agent watched a toy car moving from one into another box.
Subsequently, the agent disappeared behind a screen. Two doors,
one next to each box, were illuminated, accompanied by a chime.
This scene was frozen for 3 s and served as anticipatory period.
After that, the agent opened the door next to the box she had
seen the toy car disappear in. Finally, she reached for the car.
These two trials served to familiarize the participants that the
agent wants to get the car and therefore opens one of the
two doors. Second, participants learned about the contingency
between the illumination of the doors/chime and the opening
of the door in these familiarization trials. The subsequently
presented two test trials lasted for 41 s each. In the test trials,
the agent was distracted by a phone ring and did not see that
the car, after arriving at the second box, drove back to the first
box and then left the scene. Then the phone ringing stopped,
the agent turned back to the scene, and disappeared behind
the screen. The doors were illuminated, the chime sounded,
and the 3 s-long anticipatory period started. Finally, the agent
opened the door and reached for the box she falsely believed
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FIGURE 1 | Implicit mentalizing task: Still frames depicting key events of (A) one of two familiarization trials and (B) one of two test trials. In the
familiarization trials, the agent watches a car moving from one box into the other. She disappears behind the occluder, opens the door next to the box the car is in,
and takes the car. In the test trials, the agent did not witness that the car left the box she had seen it disappear in and she fruitlessly looks for it in the empty box.
Gaze data from the 3 s-long anticipatory period was analyzed. Each trial ended with the presentation of the belief-congruent action and its outcome.
the car would be located in. Half of the participants watched
horizontally flipped movies to counterbalance for the laterality of
events.
Explicit Mentalizing Task
We used the ToM scale by Wellman and Liu (2004) to assess
explicit mentalizing ability. The ToM scale consists of 6 tasks
including the following concepts: diverse desires, diverse beliefs,
knowledge access, contents false belief, real apparent emotion,
and explicit false belief. We used the validated German version by
Kristen et al. (2006). All tasks were presented with the help of toys
and pictures. The first two tasks do not require a representational
understanding of mental states whereas the following tasks do.
Overall, a score of 6 for solving all six tasks could be achieved.
We adhered to the procedure as described by Wellman and Liu
(2004).
Executive Function Tasks
Executive function was assessed employing two card-sorting
tasks, which draw on cognitive flexibility and self-control, namely
the dimensional change card sorting task (DCCS) and the
reversal shift test. Both tasks consist of two different sets of cards,
which include two goal cards and 30 test cards. The goal cards
were assigned to a box each and the test cards had to be sorted
into the boxes according to a certain rule. There were always three
phases for the tasks: a pre-switch phase, a post-switch phase, and
a mix-phase that consisted of a mix of the previous two phases.
The DCCS (modified by Kloo et al., 2008) was administered
according to the procedure described by Zelazo (2006). The two
goal cards depicted a green apple and a red banana. Children were
asked to sort cards either according to the form or according to
the color. In the pre-switch phase, children had to sort everything
according to color. In the post-switch phase, the rule was to sort
according to form. The last phase, namely the mix-phase, was
added to the procedure by Zelazo (2006), to have an additional
level of difficulty and thereby the ability to further differentiate
performance. In this last phase participants had to switch back
and forth between the previous two tasks and rules.
The reversal shift test was based on the one-dimensional card
sorting task by Perner and Lang (2002). The two goal cards
showed an elephant and a bunny. Both cards had the color
beige and therefore only differed in the type of animal shown.
Here, the pre-switch phase was to play the game “correctly”,
i.e., put the elephants to the elephants, etc., and the post-switch
phase required playing the game “incorrectly”, i.e., putting the
elephants to the bunnies and bunnies to the elephants. In the
mix-phase, which was added just like in the DCCS, the rules were
intermixed.
Procedure
The children performed the implicit mentalizing task first. Eye
tracking stimuli were presented with Tobii Studio (Version
2.2, Tobii Technology) on a Tobii T60 eye tracker (60 Hz
sampling rate, inbuilt 17-inch TFT screen, 1280 × 1024 pixels;
Tobii Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). The participants sat
on a chair with a distance of approximately 60 cm from the
screen. A 5-point calibration procedure preceded the stimulus
presentation. The explicit mentalizing task and the executive
function tasks were performed at a table with the experimenter
seated across from the child. Subsequently, verbal and non-verbal
IQ subtests were administered. Caregivers filled the SRS and SCQ
questionnaires during the experimental session with the child.
Data Analysis
Statistical analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics 23
(SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). As preliminary analyses revealed
no influence of sex, data was collapsed across this variable. The
significance level was p ≤ 0.05.
Implicit Mentalizing Task
Analyses of raw data were conducted using customized scripts in
R (R Core Team, 2013). A velocity-based fixation filter (Salvucci
and Goldberg, 2000) with a velocity threshold of 0.05◦/ms was
used to define the fixations. Additionally, a temporal threshold
was set to exclude fixations that lasted less than 80 ms. As
fixations on the doors during the 3 s-long anticipatory period
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FIGURE 2 | Implicit mentalizing task: mean differential looking scores
(DLS; ±SEM) from children with ASC and children from the control
group per test trial.
were the critical measure, the two doors were chosen as areas
of interest (AOIs; approximately 2.8◦ × 2.8◦) for data analysis.
The door the character opened after the anticipatory period was
defined as the “correct door,” whereas the other door is referred
to as the “incorrect door.” A differential looking score (DLS)
according to Senju et al. (2009) was calculated by subtracting the
total duration of fixations on the incorrect door from the total
duration of fixations on the correct door, and then dividing it
by the sum of the total duration of fixations on both doors. The
DLS ranges from 1 (visual preference for correct door) to −1
(visual preference for incorrect door). A value around 0 indicates
no preference for one of the two doors. Participants who had
a looking bias toward the correct door in at least one of the
two familiarization trials were included in the further analysis.
Four children from the ASD group and four children from the
control group had to be excluded as they did not show this belief-
congruent anticipatory looking behavior. Note that this differs
slightly from Senju et al. (2010), who only included participants
who looked longer to the correct than to the incorrect door in
the last familiarization trial. Senju et al. (2010) presented four
familiarization trials in contrast to only two in the current study.
This presumably made it easier for their participants to learn
the contingency between the door illumination and the reaching
action. Because of this, and to be consistent with our previous
study with adults, we adjusted our criterion. Applying Senju
et al.’s criterion to our sample would have resulted in excluding
five additional participants with ASC and one additional control
participant. Notably, preliminary analyses revealed that using
Senju et al.’s criterion did not change the pattern of DLS results.
Additionally, first looks toward the two doors in the
anticipatory period were analyzed. It was coded whether the first
fixation after the illumination of the doors was on the correct or
incorrect door.
Explicit Mentalizing Task
To pass each of the ToM scale subtests it was required to
answer both the test and the control questions correctly. For
each solved task a point was given resulting in a maximum
of 6 points. The percentage of correct responses was used for
statistical analyses. One child with ASC and one child from
the control group refused to take part in the ToM scale.
A second coder recoded test and control questions of 33% of
the whole sample from a video recording of the test session The
Inter-rater reliability revealed an agreement of 100% (Cohen’s
kappa= 1).
Executive Functions Task
To pass the DCCS and the reversal shift tasks a certain number
of cards had to be sorted correctly. For the first two phases of
the tasks it was necessary to sort at least five cards correctly. To
pass the last phase, at least nine cards had to be sorted correctly
(Zelazo, 2006). The third phase was only administered if a child
sorted at least five cards in each of the other phases correctly.
None of the children failed the pre-switch-phase. One control
child refused to take part in the executive function tasks. The
maximum that could be achieved in this set of tasks was a score
of 6 for passing all three phases of both tasks. Statistical analyses
are based on the percentage of correct responses. Inter-rater
reliability was assessed as in the explicit mentalizing task. It again
revealed a perfect agreement (Cohen’s kappa= 1).
RESULTS
Implicit Mentalizing Task
The DLS was analyzed via a 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA
with the between factor group (ASC group, control group) and
the within factor test trial (first, second). Figure 2 displays mean
DLS scores for group and test trial. The ANOVA revealed a
significant effect of group, F(1,33) = 10.55, p = 0.003, η2 = 0.24,
but no effect of test trial, F(1,33) = 0.60, p = 0.446, η2 = 0.02.
There was also no significant interaction between group and test
trial, F(1,33) = 0.34, p = 0.441, η2 = 0.02. Overall, the control
group showed a stronger looking bias toward the correct door
(M = 0.21, SD= 0.42) compared to the ASC group (M =−0.23,
SD= 0.33).
Because of our a priori interest in a potential learning
effect from one test trial to another, we checked for significant
differences in DLS scores between the first and second test trial
within each group. Neither in children with ASC, nor in the
control group, the DLS differed between the first and second test
trial [ASC group: t(13) = 0.96, p = 0.357, Cohen’s d = 0.53;
control group: t(20) = −0.01, p = 0.995, Cohen’s d = 0.00].
Consequently, we collapsed the DLS score across both test trials
for further analyses.
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FIGURE 3 | Implicit mentalizing task: percentage of correct first
fixations from children with ASC and children from the control group
per test trial. The dotted line indicates chance level.
To check whether children from the ASC group and the
control group had a looking bias significantly different from
chance, we calculated one-sample t-tests against zero for each
group. The control group looked significantly more at the correct
door compared to the incorrect door, t(20) = 2.28, p = 0.034,
Cohen’s d = 1.02, whereas the ASC group looked significantly
more at the incorrect door compared to the correct door,
t(13)=−2.53, p= 0.025, Cohen’s d =−1.41.
For the first fixations, a binominal logistic regression
was calculated with the dichotomous dependent variable
performance (0 or 1) and the categorical independent variables
group (ASC group = 1, control group = 0) and test trial
(first test trial = 0, second test trial = 1). Figure 3 shows
percentage of correct first fixations per group and test trial. The
intention was to assess the influence of group and test trial
repetition on the location of first fixations. The logistic regression
model was statistically significant, χ2(1) = 6.84, p = 0.033; and
explained 12.4% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in first fixations.
The model correctly classified 62.9% of all cases. There was a
significant effect of group as a predictor (B = 1.02, SE = 0.52,
Wald = 3.86, p = 0.049). Participants with ASC were 2.77 times
more likely to direct their first fixation to the incorrect door as
compared to the controls. There was no significant effect of test
trial as predictor (B= 0.86, SE= 0.51, Wald = 2.91, p= 0.088).
Analogous to the DLS analysis, we compared first fixations
between the first and second test trial within each group. There
was neither a difference in first fixations between trials for the
ASC group (p = 0.414, McNemar’s Test, one-tailed), nor for the
control group (p= 0.687, McNemar’s Test, one-tailed).
To check whether children from the ASC group and the
control group had a first fixation preference for the correct door
significantly different from chance, we created a percentage score
over both test trials, which was then tested against zero for each
group. Neither the ASC group, t(13)=−1.47, p= 0.165, Cohen’s
d = −0.82, nor the control group differed significantly from
chance, t(20)= 1.45, p= 0.162, Cohen’s d = 0.65.
Explicit Mentalizing Task
The control children achieved an average performance of 85%
(range = 25–100%, SD = 21%). The children with ASC solved
70% (range = 25–100%, SD = 31%) of tasks from the ToM
scale. Performance of children with ASC and controls did not
significantly differ, t(31)=−1.51, p= 0.112, Cohen’s d =−0.54.
Executive Function Task
In the executive function tasks the control children solved an
average of 98.3% of the tasks correctly (range= 5−6, SD= 6.6%).
The ASC group solved 81.7 tasks on average (range = 2–6,
SD = 21.7%). The groups differed significantly in their executive
function skill, t(32)=−3.26, p= 0.003, Cohen’s d =−0.99.
Post hoc Analyses
As the two groups differed in executive function, the ANOVA
of the DLS performance − the variable of key interest − was
repeated with executive function task performance as a covariate.
The pattern of results did not change. We again found a
significant effect of group, F(1,31) = 5.57, p = 0.025, η2 = 0.15,
but no effect of test trial, F(1,31) = 0.23, p = 0.634, η2 = 0.01.
Also the group × test trial interaction was not significant,
F(1,31) = 0.28, p = 0.471, η2 = 0.02. Additionally, we checked
for each group whether executive function tasks performance is
related to performance in the implicit and explicit mentalizing
task. Neither in children with ASC, nor in the control group,
a significant correlation between performance in the implicit
mentalizing task and the executive function tasks was observed
(ASC group: r = 0.34, p = 0.232; control group: r = 0.36,
p = 0.879). However, there was a significant correlation between
executive function tasks performance and explicit mentalizing
task performance in the ASC group (r = 0.61, p = 0.012) and
the control group (r = 0.45, p= 0.045).
DISCUSSION
The current implicit mentalizing task revealed a difference
between 8-year-old children with ASC and matched control
children in the spontaneous anticipation of an agent’s false belief-
based action. Whereas neurotypical children’s looking bias over
two test trials suggests that they predicted the agent’s action based
on her false belief, children with ASC lacked this appreciation of
the agent’s false belief-congruent action. In contrast, over both
test trials, they even displayed a significant looking bias toward
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the incorrect door. Repeating the test trial had no effect on
anticipatory looking.
The finding that 8-year-olds with ASC did not systematically
generate false belief-based action anticipations confirms an
implicit mentalizing deficit in children with ASC, previously
documented in 10-year-olds (Senju et al., 2010). However, in the
previous study by Senju et al. (2010), children with ASC and
their controls differed not only in implicit, but also in explicit
mentalizing task performance. Thus, it could not be ruled out
completely that group differences in implicit mentalizing arose
from differences in explicit mentalizing, maybe mediated by
verbal intelligence. Our results advance previous research by
showing that poor performance persists, even when children
with ASC and their control group are closely matched for
chronological age, verbal and non-verbal intelligence and explicit
mentalizing skills. Together, both studies point to a specific deficit
in implicit mentalizing in children with ASC.
By repeating the test trial, we were able to check whether
participants learned from the presentation of the false belief-
based action and its outcome. The lacking effect of test
trial repetition indicated no experience-based modulation of
anticipatory looking in the repeated presentation of the test trial.
Consequently, we collapsed gaze data over the two test trials for
each group. Comparing anticipatory looking over both test trials
against chance performance showed that neurotypical children
systematically predicted that the agent would open the box in
which she falsely believed the car would be located. This finding
helps closing a gap of evidence on implicit mentalizing beyond
early childhood. Recent two-systems accounts on mentalizing
claimed that implicit mentalizing is already present in infancy
and co-exists in parallel to later developing explicit mentalizing
(Apperly and Butterfill, 2009). Yet, this remains to be proven
empirically. Together with other recent work (Low, 2010; Senju
et al., 2010; Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2016), our findings suggest
that implicit mentalizing indeed is a phenomenon presumably
persisting across lifespan.
Contrary to what we expected, test trial repetition had no effect
on anticipatory looking in 8-year-old children with ASC. In a
previous study with adults with ASC, showing the false-belief
based action and its outcome (i.e., the agent opens the empty box
and vainly looks for the ball) only once, was sufficient to increased
the looking bias toward the false belief-congruent door in the
second test trial (Schuwerk et al., 2015). In the second test trial,
adults with ASC performed as good as neurotypical controls. This
suggested that rapid learning from action-outcome contingencies
modulated gaze behavior in this implicit mentalizing task.
However, although the current stimulus material was identical,
this was not what we observed in the present sample of children
with ASC. On the contrary, in the second test trial the DLS was
even more negative than the one in the first test trial, what led to
a significant looking bias toward the incorrect box.
A possible explanation for this finding is the counterbalancing
of our stimulus material across the two test trials. In the first test
trial, the agent opened the right door (left door, respectively) to
look for the car. In the second test trial, the presented movie
was flipped horizontally, so that the door that would be opened
was on the opposite side. It could be that children with ASC
perseverated on the location in which they saw the agent reaching
for the car in the previous test trial. This could in turn reflect
a simple action prediction strategy, which might be fruitful in
several cases, but not in the current situation. It seems that
children with ASC let themselves be guided by superficial scene
properties (i.e., location) and that they were not yet able to
use action-effect contingencies. Yet, future research is needed
to pin down whether children with ASC make use of such a
location-bound action prediction strategy.
In summary, our findings point to a sustained implicit
mentalizing deficit that cannot be easily addressed by experience.
It seems that 8-year-old children with ASC, in contrast to adults
with ASC, are not yet capable of employing information about
perception-action contingencies to compensate for an implicit
mentalizing deficit.
Notably, our group of children with ASC performed poorer
than the control children in the executive function tasks. To
check whether poorer executive function could contribute to
the observed group difference in the implicit mentalizing task,
we ran post hoc analyses. First, including the performance in
the executive function tasks as a covariate and the DLS analysis
revealed the same pattern of results. Second, within each group,
executive function performance was unrelated to anticipatory
looking in the implicit mentalizing task. This gives us good reason
to conclude that anticipatory looking in the current implicit
mentalizing task did not rely on voluntary cognitive control and
that the lacking systematic false belief-based action prediction
of children with ASC cannot be explained by poorer executive
function skills.
Interestingly, our post hoc analyses revealed a positive
correlation between performance in the executive function tasks
and explicit mentalizing ability. This is in line with a large body
of evidence on the close link between both cognitive domains
(for a recent meta-analysis, see Devine and Hughes, 2014).
Further, consistent with recent evidence (Low, 2010; Grosse
Wiesmann et al., 2016), we found that executive function task
performance was related to performance in the explicit, but not
in the implicit mentalizing task. This provides further support
for two-systems accounts of mentalizing (Apperly and Butterfill,
2009; cf., Perner and Roessler, 2012). The implicit system enables
already young children to be sensitive to false beliefs. This system
works involuntarily, fast, effortless, but inflexibly. The around the
age of 4 developing explicit system allows to voluntary switch
perspectives and to consider another’s false belief to generate
action explanations. This system is flexible but slow, and draws
on cognitive resources.
When investigating social cognition in ASC using eye
tracking, potentially confounding deficits in general visual
processing have to be taken into account. In other words, is
the group difference we observed in the implicit mentalizing
task attributable to an implicit mentalizing deficit, or did this
difference arise from general – and not specifically social –
visual processing deficits in ASC? The following aspects of our
paradigm help to address alternative explanations in terms of
general atypical visual processing in the group of children with
ASC. First, to account for a potentially weaker saccadic accuracy
in ASC (e.g., Schmitt et al., 2014), a calibration procedure prior to
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the implicit mentalizing task ensured that the fixation of targets
was sufficiently accurate. Second, Wang et al. (2015) recently
reported atypical visual saliency in the first few seconds of scene
perception in ASC. The scene, the agent and the objects of the
present paradigm, were introduced for several minutes to avoid
potential group differences in early visual processing of the scene.
Third, events took place slowly, and the anticipatory period
was statistic without displaying an agent. This should render
any impact of movement/biological motion and social stimuli
processing deficits in ASC (Blake et al., 2003; Dakin and Frith,
2005; Guillon et al., 2014) neglectable.
Future research that carefully contrasts social and non-
social stimuli is necessary to unravel the relationship between
implicit social cognitive and rather general visual processing
characteristics in ASC (for an example, see von Hofsten
et al., 2009). To date, it is unclear whether these two
are independent phenomena, whether visual processing
characteristics contribute to social cognitive deficits (Behrmann
et al., 2006; Hellendoorn et al., 2014), or whether both are
manifestations of an impaired underlying cognitive ability (Sinha
et al., 2014).
In summary, our findings provide support for a persistent
implicit mentalizing ability in neurotypical development beyond
early childhood. The observed intact explicit, but impaired
implicit mentalizing in ASC, and the observed link between
executive functions and explicit, but not implicit mentalizing,
is in line with theories on two dissociable mentalizing systems.
Further, it seems that 8-year-old children with ASC are not
yet capable of employing information about perception-action
contingencies to compensate for an implicit mentalizing deficit.
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